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ENABLE MORE TRANSPARENCY
Local governments should provide extensive, easily 
accessible information about TIF use, revenues, and 
expenditures, and they should document progress 
toward clearly articulated goals. TIF spending is funda-
mentally different from other government spending; 
districts are often not subject to ordinary democratic 
controls, thus meriting much more reporting and 
transparency. Furthermore, municipal legislators should 
be able to make evidence-based adjustments to TIF 
districts, such as limiting durations or dissolving those 
that do not meet the jurisdiction’s objectives.
CONDUCT COMPARATIVE RESEARCH
Researchers should study, document, and explain the 
mixed outcomes of TIF and expand knowledge about the 
types of TIF expenditures that best promote economic 
development. To date, academic studies of TIF document 
mixed outcomes but do not clearly identify factors that 
explain variations in outcomes of TIF use in various 
geographic areas.
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By David Merriman
Tax increment financing (TIF), a popular economic 
development tool across the United States, often 
falls short of its promise to revitalize struggling 
neighborhoods. 
 TIF earmarks property tax revenue increases  
(or “increments”) in a designated area that are 
expected to result from new development and real 
estate appreciation generated by the TIF. Enabled by 
the state, city governments typically create new TIF 
districts and specify their goals, permitted expendi-
tures, and terms of operation. 
 This practice allows cities to divert revenues of 
overlying governments—such as counties or school 
districts—to fund economic development, rational-
izing that diverted revenues would not exist “but for” 
the economic activity TIF funds. Therefore, in theory, 
there is no loss to overlying governments, and 
developers receive no subsidy unless they  
spur development. Indeed, TIF’s power lies in its 
potential to bring together private- and public- 
sector actors to stimulate growth. 
 In practice, however, TIF remains highly vulnera-
ble to exploitation, misuse, and uneven application.  
Additionally, many recent studies show that TIF does 
little to generate economic growth, and any develop-
ment that emerges is not necessarily attributable to 
TIF. Instead, TIF can divert needed property tax 
revenues from overlying governments, obscure 
municipal financial records, and facilitate unproduc-
tive fiscal competition between neighboring 
jurisdictions. 
 Empirical studies of TIF-related impacts—such 
as on school finance, land uses, and budgeting— 
suggest communities should use TIF cautiously  
to avoid unintended consequences. Nevertheless, 
promoting economic activity is a key function of 
local government and requires cooperation between 
the government and the private sector. Used 
carefully, TIF can generate those desirable and 
positive impacts—but such results are by no  
means guaranteed.
Communities should use TIF cautiously to 
avoid unintended consequences.
POLICY BRIEF
IMPROVING TAX INCREMENT FINANCING (TIF) 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
TIF has been used very unevenly across states. 
It is reasonable to speculate that states’ 
responses to their neighbors’ use of TIF have 
contributed to this pattern of unevenness, 
though the reasons for the uneven use of TIF 
have not been rigorously studied.
Arizona is the only U.S. state that has not 
enabled some form of TIF, although many 
states use different terms for the practice, 
such as “Tax Allocation Districts” in Georgia.
Source: Merriman 2018. Categories for MT, NH, SC, 
and TN are best available estimates
Recommendations
TRACK AND MONITOR TIF USE
Consistent monitoring would help states better evaluate 
the use of TIF and support state legislators in under-
standing whether and how TIF actually works. Virtually 
all states monitor property tax assessment processes 
and could easily track TIF districts as well. Wisconsin, 
which already requires regular reporting on TIF, provides 
a particularly strong example, as it requires detailed 
delineation of expenditures and “porting,” the movement 
of TIF funds from one district to another.4
ALLOW OPT-OUTS
States should allow counties, school districts, and other 
overlying local governments to opt out of TIF, which can 
deprive them of significant and needed revenue. Recent 
legislation in Chicago may provide a model.5
REVIEW “BUT FOR” EFFICACY
States should require conclusive evidence that develop-
ment would not occur “but for” the TIF. An effective “but 
for” requirement can prevent abuse of TIF, especially 
when other policies might be more appropriate, so state 
legislators should review and revise their states’ rules to 
ensure they place effective, realistic limits on local 
governments’ use of this tool. California’s recent 






Below: Morgan Station in Chicago, funded almost fully  
through TIF, accelerated the redevelopment of the area.  
Photo: Steven Vance/ Flickr CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.
TIF Is Not Additional Land Value Capture
 
Land value capture is a policy approach that enables 
communities to recover and reinvest land value 
increases that result from public investment and 
other government actions. Since well-functioning 
property tax systems base obligations on the market 
value of real estate, the property tax can be an 
important form of land value capture.1
 
Because TIF diverts revenue from real estate appreci-
ation that may in part be due to public investment, 
some observers may erroneously believe that TIF is a 
land value capture tool separate from the property 
tax. In fact, it is more properly a device that “trans-
fers” value to, rather than “captures” value from, the 
private sector.
Figure 2
Map of Atlanta BeltLine Tax Allocation District
Source: Atlanta BeltLine, Inc. (2018). 
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TIF in Practice
As a local program enabled at the state level,  
TIF varies widely by state and even locality.  
To date, there has been no published academic 
work explaining why some states use TIF more  
than others.
 States also vary in allowed uses of TIF revenues: 
All permit the servicing of bonds, but in some states 
TIF can subsidize other development, like selling or 
renting real estate below fair-market value to 
promote construction in the TIF district. Roughly 
two-thirds of the states further allow some use of TIF 
funds for limited activities outside of the physical 
district’s boundaries.
 Transparency is an ongoing challenge, and state 
and city monitoring of TIF use is very uneven. Once a 
municipality establishes a TIF district and begins to 
receive revenues and make expenditures, it can 
account for them separately—and sometimes 
obscurely—compared to other governmental funds. 
Some states, such as Illinois, require annual reports 
on each TIF district and provide state-level data 
about TIF use. Others, such as Maine, simply verify 
that proposals for local TIF districts meet statutory 
requirements but do not then track or monitor  
active districts.  
 That lack of transparency makes it difficult to 
rigorously evaluate TIF. Though there is evidence  
that TIF works in certain cases, existing research 
suggests that most TIF uses do not accomplish the 
goal of promoting economic development. TIF may 
also bring a variety of unintended effects, such as 
diminished or reallocated school revenues and 
increased budget volatility, especially during 
unstable economic cycles. 
 TIF often fails in both obvious and subtle ways. 
For instance, TIF can fail if planned developments 
simply do not materialize, and even a successful TIF 
project may also impose negative externalities—like 
traffic, crime, or noise pollution—that lower the 
value of nearby houses or businesses. State statutes 
and regulations generally require specific criteria 
that must be documented prior to the establishment 
of a TIF district, but these criteria are generally vague 
enough that almost any project with strong political 
support can satisfy the requirements.  In particular, 
inconsistencies persist around two key questions: (1) 
What constitutes “blight” in need of redevelopment? 
and (2) Would economic growth have occurred 
without (“but for”) the TIF?
Case Studies 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
The Windy City employs TIF more than any other 
big city in the United States, with 149 districts;  
in 2015 alone, Chicago TIFs collected about  
$461 million in property tax revenues.2  The use  
of those revenues remains controversial, however; 
though much information has been made public, 
transparency remains inconsistent. Because of 
how TIF spending functions, districts can persist 
for decades without being subject to ordinary 
democratic controls. Critics called one former 
mayor’s use of TIF dollars a “shadow budget,” 
which could be allocated with minimal oversight 
from the elected city council or the general public. 
A task force convened in 2011 generated a number 
of transparency measures, including an open data 
portal, but many of its recommendations have yet 
to be acted upon—and Chicago’s evolving TIF use 
remains controversial.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
California was the first state to make extensive use 
of tax increment financing—and recently became 
the first state to reverse course and drastically 
reduce its use of TIF. In 2008, California had over 
400 TIF districts with more than $10 billion in 
annual revenue, but enabling legislation prevented 
school districts and other overlying governments 
from opting out, which resulted in ongoing 
scrambles (often at the state level) to fill resulting 
budgetary gaps. Eventually, 2010 state legislation 
essentially ended local governments’ ability to 
create TIF districts; subsequent legislation 
permitted TIF, but on a much more limited basis. 
Current state requirements for TIF use include 
affordable housing mandates, the requirement 
that overlying governments opt in, and extensive 
public input and approval.
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 
Facing severe fiscal, economic, and competitive 
challenges, St. Louis has approximately 100 TIF 
projects, mostly retail-oriented development, 
which had by early 2016 diverted $2 billion of 
public tax dollars to developers. With so many TIF 
districts, mixed results are unsurprising. Some, 
like the Cortex Redevelopment Plan, one of the 
largest TIF-supported undertakings in the area, 
generated even more outside funding and jobs 
than expected.3 By contrast, 20 projects were 
terminated before completion, and another 16 
ultimately failed to get approval; studies suggest 
this was because the retail-oriented projects 
would displace rather than create jobs. Others 
may have failed by depending too much on TIF 
financing, rather than on community partner-
ships that would help ensure long-term success. 
ATLANTA BELTLINE TAX ALLOCATION DISTRICT
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
Launched in 2006, the Atlanta BeltLine Tax 
Allocation District (TAD, Georgia’s name for a TIF 
district) was an ambitious plan to fund a new 
transit system linking multiple Atlanta neighbor-
hoods along old rail corridors surrounding the 
city (figure 2). Projected for completion by 2030 
at a total cost of up to $4.8 billion, the BeltLine 
has thus far generated mixed results, delivering 
trail and transit real estate on time but lagging 
on transit, streetscape, and affordable housing 
construction. Overall, however, the project 
maintains both popular and judicial support—
and it has continued to evolve in light of commu-
nity concerns about delays, gentrification, racial 
inequities, and government spending.
JEFFERSON COUNTY, MONTANA
A small but relatively wealthy county in south-
western Montana, Jefferson County depends 
economically on agriculture, forestry, and 
mining. When the Golden Sunlight Mine, a 
longstanding community presence and major 
employer, projected that it would shut down, the 
county proposed developing a TIF-funded 
business park to cushion the economic transi-
tion away from mining and attract high-tech 
companies and jobs. By early 2017, three years 
after the groundbreaking, the new Sunlight 
Business Park had three newly built units, 
including office and warehouse space, and a 
small number of new jobs. Development remains 
slow, but thanks to the mine operator’s commit-
ment to ensuring the county’s economic stability, 
including its partnership in the TIF district, the 
project remains poised for success.
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